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Abstract: In this paper, I address religion from a legal pers-
pective. I argue that religion should be settled outside the 
secular legal system; otherwise, the secular legal system 
would not be truly secular. However, religion demands 
special protection as a public good and social value, as it 
constitutes an extrinsic constitutional limit of the legal. 
For a secular legal system, protecting religion ultimately 
means protecting human beings’ pursuit of the supraratio-
nal. Protecting suprarationality has three important legal 
consequences: (a) suprarational acts in the strictest sense 
should never be validated as legal acts; (b) democratic com-
munities should not use suprarational arguments in legal 
discourse; and (c) the secular legal system cannot regulate 
suprarationality or the essentials of the religious commu-
nity. The protection of religion demands both a dualistic 
structure that distinguishes the political community from 
the religious community and the treatment of religion as a 
right: the right to religion.
Keywords: religion; suprarationality; political community; 
religious community; right to religion; secular legal system
Resumen: En este artículo, analizo la religión desde una 
perspectiva jurídica. Argumento que la religión debería ser 
mantenida fuera del sistema jurídico secular; de otro modo, 
este no sería propiamente secular. No obstante, la religión 
exige una protección  especial por tratarse de un bien público 
y un valor social, al tiempo que constituye un límite extrínse-
co constitucional del derecho. Para un listema jurídico secu-
lar, proteger la religión implica en último término proteger la 
búsqueda de lo supraracional por parte de los seres huma-
nos. Y esa protección tiene tres importantes consecuencias 
jurídicas.  (a) los actos supraracionales en el sentido más 
estricto nunca deberían ser validados como actos jurídicos 
(b) las comunidades democráticas no deberían utilizar argu-
mentos supraracionales en el discurso jurídico y (c) el sistema 
jurídico secular no puede regular la supraracionalidad o la 
esencia de la comunidad religiosa. La protección de la reli-
gión exige una estructura dualística que distingue la comuni-
dad política de la religiosa y al mismo tiempo el tratamiento 
de la religión como un derecho: el derecho a la religión.
Palabras clave: religión; supraracionalidad; comunidad 
política; comunidad religiosa; derecho a la religión; sistema 
jurídico secular.
I n a multifactor constitutional approach to religion, there need be no single justification for protecting religion; there can be many rationales for such protection. 1 However, we can attempt to find the ultimate justification as 
* Professor of Law and ICS Research Professor at the University of Navarra; and Francisco de 
Vitoria Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University.
1 In the same vein, greenawalt, K., Religion and the Constitution I. Fairness and Free Exercise 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2006) pg. 137. For different rationales, see 
among others: witte J. and nichols, J. A., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment 
(3rd ed., Westview Press, Boulder CO, 2011) pgs. 21-40; Koppelman, A., Defending American 
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a good starting point for analyzing other aspects of the relationship between 
religion and the secular legal system. The ultimate justification searches for 
a legal rationale to legitimize the secular legal system’s protecting religion as 
such. In my opinion, the ultimate justification of legally protecting religion lies 
in the protection of suprarationality. Suprarationality can be understood both 
in a subjective and objective sense. In a subjective sense, suprarationality refers 
to the capacity of each person to (a) freely overcome his or her own materi-
ality, individually or collectively, in the search for the fundamental and most 
profound truths about the origin, meaning, and purpose of human life and the 
universe; and (b) freely follow and share these truths as he or she understands 
them. 2 In this subjective sense, suprarationality is an experiential capacity–of 
experiencing conversion, regeneration, and purification; developing spiritual-
ity; receiving grace; gaining assurance; developing cosmic consciousness; and 
so on. According to this subjective sense, suprarational understandings, beliefs, 
and commitments come together and can be manifested in a single act (e.g., of 
worship).
In an objective sense, suprarationality is the unseen order of everything 
that is beyond or above the range of a normal or merely rational human expe-
rience. The objective approach refers to suprarationality as a potential source 
of religious knowledge, transcendent justice, spiritual happiness, and love as 
a result of harmony with that suprarational order through adjustment of our 
lives in harmony with transcendence. Since objective suprarationality can be 
pursued by different people in concert, its pursuit can be organized and insti-
tutionalized; however, an objective suprarational dimension has private as well 
as public dimensions.
Suprarationality cannot be explained from rationality; the higher cannot 
be explained by or derived from the lower. Suprarationality does not imply 
the progressive obliteration of the rational, but its progressive expansion. The 
rational is not completely separated from the suprarational, for the latter still 
Religious Neutrality Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, London 2013) pgs. 120-165; 
leiter, B., Why Tolerate Religion (Princeton University Press, Princeton, Oxford, 2013); and 
BraDy, K. A., The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, Cambridge, 2015) pgs. 285-299.
2 On the human capacity of achieving transcendent truth, Ratzinger, J., Truth and Tolerance 
(trans. Henry Taylor, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 2003) pgs. 138-161. See also panniKar, R., 
Opera Omnia II. Religion and Religions (ed. Milena Carrara Pavan, Orbis Book, 2015) pg. 260: 
«rationality is not the only criterion for truth.» 
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must cohere with the former; divine reason is also reason. 3 What distinguishes 
suprarationality is that it cannot be expressed according to the requirements 
of scientific or secular philosophic discourse. The language of suprarationality 
is fully understood only within the life of a religious community.
1. the exclusion of suprarational acts from 
the secular legal system
For legal purposes, I will call suprarational acts those religious acts that, 
though legally protected, should be constitutionally excluded from secular le-
gal systems in all circumstances (e.g.: obligation to make profession of faith; 
to go to the synagogue, the church or the mosque; or to take a religious oath). 
Excluding suprarational acts from secular legal systems does not present an 
obstacle for their legal protection; it is their exclusion that justifies their pro-
tection. Excluding the secular legal system is simply recognizing its lack of 
competence in suprarational matters.
Following classical analyses of moral acts, we can consider an act to be 
suprarational when both the subject matter and the main purpose or intention 
of the act are strictly suprarational. The subject matter of an act is suprara-
tional when suprarationality is the main good toward which the act is directed. 
Acts of faith and worship constitute two paradigmatic suprarational subject 
matters of pivotal importance to most religious faiths; thus, they are crucial 
to a legal understanding of religion in both the national and the international 
realms. 4
I understand an act of faith in the general sense as a free response of an 
individual to the suprarational. It involves an ascent of the intellect and will to 
a transcendent truth, specifically to God. It is probably the first religious expe-
rience, as it opens the door to suprarationality. I understand worship as offering 
praise and adoration to a Supreme Being, acting in reverence to other gods or 
3 See Vico, G., New Science (trans. David Marsh, Penguin Books, New York, reprint 2013) 
pg. 409: «Now, since God is pure reason, divine reason and authority are the same thing: and 
good theology places divine authority on a level with reason.»
4 This is the reason that in some European countries, some acts against worship and faith were 
criminalized (and some are even now). For an overview on the protection on worship and reli-
gious doctrine in Europe, see Doe, N., Law and Religion in Europe. A Comparative Introduction 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2011) pgs. 139-163.
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transcendent beings, and participating in individual and collective religious ritu-
als of both theistic and nontheistic religions. Worship is a consequence of faith.
Religious education, however, would not involve in this strictest sense 
suprarational subject matter, as it is directed chiefly toward education, and 
indirectly toward suprarationality. It affects suprarationality just insofar as and 
because suprarationality is a subject matter of education. Religious indoctri-
nation, in the value-neutral sense of a process of imparting doctrine in an au-
thoritative way (e.g., as in catechism), will be a suprarational act according to 
the subject matter, since the act is mainly directed to suprarationality through 
education, and not to education through suprarationality. A similar point ap-
plies to proselytizing in the sense of an act of attempting to convert people 
to another religion. It is a suprarational act because the object is deliberately 
directed toward suprarationality; therefore, it should be allowed in the public 
sphere as a manifestation of religion, but excluded for political authorities. 
Any type of coercion or threat is completely opposed to true proselytism; it 
transforms proselytism into a criminal offense; 5 however, promoting religion 
in general is not necessarily a suprarational subject matter, just as promoting 
marriage is not a marital act, but a political one that is beneficial to marriage.
By promoting religion, a legal system is not necessarily acting suprara-
tionally in the strictest sense. For this reason, establishing religion is not prop-
erly a suprarational act, but both a religious and political act in the broadest 
senses. Therefore, establishment, or at least some types of non-coercive es-
tablishments, could be in accordance with a secular legal system. 6 A different 
question is whether the establishment of a religion is the best framework to 
protect religious freedom. In my opinion, nonestablishment is the best way to 
fully protect religious freedom; indeed, it is the best way to protect religion. 
History has confirmed this statement many times.
The intention, end or main purpose (finis operis) of the action is one with 
the subject matter of the suprarational act. 7 In order to have a suprarational 
5 For an overview of the regulation of proselytism, see witte, J. Jr. and martin, R. C., Sharing 
the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism (Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 
New York, 1999). 
6 In the same vein, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 paragraph 9 
(Forty-eighth session, 1993). Compilation of General Comments and General Recommenda-
tions Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994).
7 The intention as such cannot be recognized by the legal system. However, legal systems are able 
to recognize the external expressions and manifestations of a concrete internal intention. 
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act, both the subject matter and main purpose or end of the act (finis operis) 
should be suprarational. Reading the Koran is an act whose objective subject 
matter is suprarational, but the act overall can be non-suprarational if the 
reading intention is historical, cultural, or comparative rather than spiritual 
or religious. The same goes, of course, for reading any other religious text. If 
the purpose of reading the Bible in a public school is cultural (i.e., to read one 
of the most influential books in the history of humanity), for example, the act 
would not be suprarational, as it would be if the Bible were presented as the 
Word of God and a source of suprarational knowledge. 8
A suprarational intention or purpose of the acting person (finis operantis) 
cannot convert a non-suprarational act into a strictly suprarational act if the 
subject matter is not mainly or exclusively suprarational. Giving alms is ba-
sically a moral act of generosity and solidarity; it could have a suprarational 
purpose for some people but not others. Therefore, giving alms could be 
considered a suprarational act for legal purposes or subjectively for those 
persons giving alms for religious reasons. But because the subject matter (and 
the finis operis) are not exclusively suprarational, almsgiving cannot be ex-
cluded from the legal system. A similar situation occurs with marriage. For 
many religious people, marriage is a suprarational act–a religious covenant or 
even a sacrament–however, because the subject matter (and the finis operis) of 
marriage is not exclusively suprarational, but also rational, marriage cannot 
be excluded from the legal realm. A secular legal system should not refrain 
from regulating marriage because of its suprarational character, but it should 
refrain from regulating suprarational aspects of marriage (e.g., imposing the 
religious ceremony as the only way to marry). An act should be beyond the 
legal system’s regulation only if it is strictly suprarational. And even though 
a suprarational intention of the acting person with or without suprarational 
subject matter can make a particular act suprarational overall, it cannot make 
all acts of that type strictly suprarational (and therefore beyond the state’s 
proper control).
Circumstances by themselves cannot change the quality or nature of an 
act’s subject matter, to make it either religious or non-religious if it is the 
8 In Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court treated Bi-
ble-reading as it had prayer: The Bible readings in Abington were clearly «religious exercises», 
the Court concluded. However, Justice Tom C. Clark, who delivered the opinion of the Court, 
opened the door to the objective value of religious instruction for non-spiritual purposes.
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opposite by nature. Circumstances can change the main purpose or intention 
of an act, however, by shifting from a chiefly or even exclusive religious pur-
pose to a chiefly nonreligious purpose or vice versa. For example, based on 
historical grounds (i.e., on circumstances), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the hiring of chaplains to open legislative sessions with prayers. 9 Chief Justice 
Burger’s opinion appealed to the «unique history» 10 of the legislative chap-
lains in the United States since the Continental Congress in 1774. Prayer is a 
religious subject matter. The intention or purpose to pray at the beginning of 
the session was chiefly religious. But historical circumstances converted these 
chiefly religious purposes into a cultural purpose so that the act of praying at 
the beginning of the legislative session was deemed, from a legal perspective, 
more cultural than religious.
This is similar to what has occurred in Spain. Based on cultural and his-
torical traditions, the Spanish Constitutional Court held that the national 
police, as members of a religious fraternity, could participate in a religious 
procession during the celebration of the Catholic Holy Week. 11 In 2011, the 
Spanish Constitutional Court also held that it was not unconstitutional for the 
statutes of the Bar Association in Seville to proclaim as its honorary patron the 
Virgin Mary, in her avocation as the Immaculate Conception. 12 Participating 
in a religious procession and appointing the Virgin Mary as patron of a sec-
ular institution are acts whose objective subject matter is religious; however, 
the main purpose of a religious act can change. For example, what is mainly 
non-suprarational in Spain based on certain historical circumstances could be 
suprarational in the United States under other circumstances.
In sum, the only suprarational acts that must be avoided in all circum-
stances by political authorities are those whose subject matter and main pur-
pose are strictly suprarational, where circumstances have not changed to 
change their (primary) purpose. When a legal system fails to exclude suprara-
tional acts in this strict sense, it abandons its secular character.
9 See Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The argument that military and prison chaplains 
are required for protection of the free exercise clause is not relevant here since free exercise 
does not demand religious practices in legislative sessions. See greenawalt, K., Religion and the 
Constitution II. Establishment and Fairness (Princeton University Press, Princeton, Oxford, 2008) 
pg. 94 nt. 1.
10 See Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983).
11 Spanish Constitutional Court (STC) 101/2004. 
12 Spanish Constitutional Court (STC) 34/2011.
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2. the suprarational argument as an irreleVant legal argument
Suprarational arguments are those arguments whose premises (typically 
in the form of propositions, statements, or sentences) in support of a claim, 
the conclusion, are beyond the reach of reason unaided by revelation. «Since 
God redeemed humankind, human beings should love each other», is an 
example of a suprarational conclusion drawn from a suprarational premise. 
«Homosexual acts should be legally banned because the Bible rejects them» 
is also based on a suprarational premise. Suprarational arguments are chiefly 
based on premises derived from pronouncements of religious authorities and 
books, traditional religious practices, or mystical or revelatory experiences. 13 
Suprarational arguments should not be used in the legal discourse of demo-
cratic communities because secular legal systems should operate always within 
the rational realm. Reason is the only language that secular legal systems can 
understand; therefore, suprarational arguments should receive the same treat-
ment as suprarational acts. Suprarational arguments should be placed outside 
the secular legal system. This exclusion is exactly what makes a legal system 
secular in the first place.
This hallmark of the secular legal system does not necessarily put reli-
gion as a whole outside the domain of public reason, as Rawls suggested, 14 
nor does it expel religion from political deliberation. The realm of political 
deliberation is larger than the realm of strictly legal deliberation. And what 
is placed outside the legal system is only suprarational argumentation, which 
is only a part of any religion. The reason is that the suprarational argument 
is essentially unintelligible by secular legal systems. Suprarational argument 
should be outside of the legal realm for the further reason that it cannot prop-
erly be imposed: suprarationality requires free adherence. A coercive supra-
rationality is a contradiction in terms. Since legal systems are, by definition, 
coercive, they cannot use suprarational arguments. This is not a matter of 
discrimination by exclusion; it is a matter of the nature of the system and types 
of argumentation in question.
13 For a more detailed approach of the religious argument, see march, A. F., «Rethinking Reli-
gious Reason in Public Justification», in American Political Science Review 107 (2013) 523-539. 
14 See, rawls, J., Political Liberalism (expanded edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 
reprint 2005) pgs. 224-225.
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Secular legal systems should protect the suprarational, but they cannot 
deploy it. They protect it for a legal reason as well, which is itself by definition 
secular. In this sense, I do not agree with Eberle when he argued that «each 
citizen should feel free to support coercive laws on the basis of her religious 
convictions–even on the basis of her religious convictions alone–so long as 
she conscientiously regards her religious convictions as providing a sufficient 
basis for those laws.» 15 Behind this statement there is a category error–the use 
of legal coercion for suprarational reasons. Legal coercion can be used only 
for legal purposes and must be reduced to the realm of the legal. In order to 
legitimize the use of legal coercion to protect religious convictions, religious 
convictions must be supported by a legal rationale. There are, for instance, 
both religious and legal arguments for using legal coercion to avoid political 
corruption, but there is no legal argument for supporting some expressions of 
so-called blue laws in the United States (e.g., restricting or banning the sale of 
alcoholic beverages on Sundays for religious purposes). 16
But let us not mistake a part for a whole. Suprarational arguments can-
not be converted into rational arguments by changing the premise, as the 
result would be a different argument; however, religious ideas and values, not 
suprarational arguments, can be used in political deliberations, and many of 
them can be converted into legal rationales for public policy. It is not possi-
ble to erect a barrier between culture, including religious culture, and public 
deliberation. Since religion operates in the public sphere and religious com-
munities are inescapably a part of the political community, religion cannot be 
ostracized.
As McConnell has shown, Americans owe much to Calvinist and Baptist 
preaching in support of independence; the Protestant ministers were the ide-
ological commissars of the American Revolution, and the principal arguments 
for religious freedom and against establishments were religious in content. 17 
Something similar is true of the birth of the European Union, in which the 
Christian idea of forgiveness after the Second World War played a decisive 
15 eBerle, Ch. J., Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
New York, 2002) pg. 333.
16 For an historical overview of Blue Laws in the United States, see raucher, A., «Sunday Busi-
ness and the Decline of Sunday Closing Laws», in Journal of Church and State 36 (1994) 13-33.
17 mcconnell, M. W., «Secular Reason and the Misguided Attempt to Exclude Religious Ar-
gument from Democratic Deliberation», in Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture 1 (2007) 162-
164. 
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role; 18 and of the Civil Rights Movement, led by Martin Luther King, Jr. Re-
ligious ideas, however, require transformation in order to become legal. This 
transformation is possible because the suprarational presupposes the rational. 
It is beyond the rational, but not against the rational. Behind the American 
Constitution, the Human Rights Movement, or the birth of the European Un-
ion, many wonderful and beautiful religious ideas, ideals, and aspirations exist. 
But the final legal result (e.g., the American Constitution, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, or the Treaty of Lisbon) does not include suprarational arguments. 
Each is secular by nature.
In other words, the secular can be founded on both secular and religious 
origins. In the latter case, the secular will follow a process of transformation 
(appropriate secularization). To fail to recognize this second source of genuine 
secularity is to forget the source of legality itself. The very idea of law was 
originally a religious idea before being developed into a secular idea. 19 More-
over, in modern society, there are deeper arguments for avoiding the death 
penalty, for example, based on religion than there are based on strict secular-
ity. 20 Religious arguments can and should be used in political deliberation to 
urge against the death penalty or torture, but the final legal ban of the death 
penalty or torture should be based on a secular argument. This is the only type 
of argument that can be recognized by a legal system.
The idea that legal systems cannot use suprarational argumentation is 
consistent with the ideals of democratic equality that a secular legal system 
ostensibly seeks to protect. 21 Politicians can use religious argument in their 
political campaigns if they want to use it, but religious arguments should be 
excluded from legal reasoning as a matter of principle. It is also a matter of 
18 See weiler, J., Un’Europa cristiana. Un saggio esplorativo (Rizzoli, Milan, 2003).
19 See Brague, R., The Law of God. The Philosophical History of an Idea (trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 2007) 
20 In this vein, on torture, see walDron, J., «Two-Way Translation: The Ethics of Engaging with 
Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation», in Mercer Law Review 63 (2012) 845-868. 
21 mcconnell, M. W., «Secular Reason and the Misguided Attempt to Exclude Religious Ar-
gument from Democratic Deliberation», in Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture 1 (2007) 159-
174, at 174 offers a good argument for the internal inconsistency of the prohibition of the 
religious argumentation in democratic deliberation. However, his argument is not in tension 
with mine. What I argue is that suprarationality does not cohere with legal coercion, but does 
that not mean that the religious argumentation in general must be excluded from democratic 
deliberation. It just means that the suprarational argumentation must be excluded from legal 
deliberation.
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language, as the language of the secular legal system is not religious. 22 Again, 
legal coercion and religious suprarationality are incompatible, but religion 
and politics are compatible.
I basically agree with Audi’s formulation of what we might call a principle 
of secularity, meant to moderate legal appeals to religious reasons. His formu-
lation is in positive terms (in terms of having an adequate secular reason, not 
in terms of not also having non-secular reasons) and has a sociopolitical char-
acter: «Citizens in a democracy have a prima facie obligation not to advocate 
or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless they 
have, and are willing to offer, adequate secular reason for this advocacy or sup-
port.» 23 My formulation, however, is legal and put in negative terms, since I 
see the suprarational as an extrinsic constitutional limit of the secular. Inspired 
by Audi’s formulation, I would say that the secular legal system of democratic 
societies should not contain any law or public policy that restricts human con-
duct based exclusively on suprarational considerations.
Because it is positive, Audi’s principle is more restrictive than my for-
mulation. Audi incorporates a judgment about the adequacy of the secular 
reason. This element makes sense when dealing with the secular legal system 
from within, but not when dealing with the secular legal system from with-
out. From a legal perspective, the most important feature of Audi’s principle 
of secular reason is that it is not exclusive; therefore, it is not antireligious. 
It does not put away religious reason. It just demands a secular rationale to 
supplement religious reasons, based on the idea that «freedom is the default 
position in a liberal democracy.» 24
My formulation does not imply that religion should be privatized in lib-
eral democracies, let alone that citizens have the civil obligation to vote ac-
cording to secular arguments. A Muslim can defend legalizing polygamy for 
religious reasons, but a law allowing polygamy should be based on a secular 
argument (e.g., sexual freedom and free private partnership). On the other 
hand, a Catholic can defend banning polygamy for religious reasons, but a law 
22 See Zucca, L., A Secular Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2012) 
pg. 196. However, may legal terms have a religious origin. On the relation between language 
and law, see Berman, H., Law and Language: Effective Symbols of Community (ed. John Witte, Jr., 
Cambridge University Press, New York, Cambridge, 2013).
23 auDi, R., Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, New York, 2011) pgs. 65-66.
24 Ibid., pg. 69. 
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banning polygamy should be based on a secular argument (e.g., sexual equal-
ity, tradition, education of children, etc.). In a referendum on polygamy, both 
parties can vote based on religious premises. However, a passed bill without a 
rational argument supporting it would go against the constitutional nature of 
the secular legal system.
In sum, suprarational argumentation cannot be the exclusive justification 
of legal deliberation. Legal deliberation demands a secular rationale. This fact 
does not take away religious argumentation from political deliberation, let 
alone reduce it to the private realm. The demand of rationality is simply an 
expression of the essence of the secular legal system. Secular legal systems 
should be open to transcendence, but they must not be entangled in suprara-
tional issues. In order to be inside the legal system, the suprarational argument 
should be supported by a rational argument; otherwise, it cannot be legal.
3. structural Dualism
Structural dualism means that no legal constitutional model of a political 
community can adequately protect the transcendent or suprarational dimen-
sion of human beings without creating a dualistic structure that guarantees 
sufficient autonomy for religion and religious communities. Such dualism is 
also a necessary, though not a sufficient condition, for guaranteeing equal re-
ligious freedom for all citizens and preventing unfair religious interference 
with the political realm. Without dualism, a secular legal system cannot be 
properly developed and no state can be reasonably classified as a liberal de-
mocracy. Dualism is beneficial for both religion and politics–it protects re-
ligious communities from political communities, and political communities 
from religious communities. 25 Dualism is the most important consequence 
of the incompatibility between religious suprarationality and legal coercion.
There are at least four considerations that support this dualistic structure 
of society, all of which are deeply related to and ultimately based on freedom. 
The first was already explained: religion, in the strictest sense of supraration-
ality, constitutes a constitutional limit of the legal system of a political com-
munity. (That is not true of other goods and values, such as art, knowledge, 
25 See rawls, J., «The Idea of Public Reason Revisited», in Political Liberalism (expanded edition, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 2005) esp. pg. 476.
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and sociability.) But religion in the broadest sense does have political dimen-
sions. It can and should be manifested in the public sphere. There is no reason 
for restraint. Yet it also has a constitutive, nonpolitical dimension insofar as 
it involves the suprarational, which should not be a matter of state coercion. 
This is not a stipulation about what I mean by «religion», but the formulation 
of an aspect of religion with important legal relevance.
We can make the same two points from the perspective of politics. It has 
a religious dimension, in that it embraces all types of communities, including 
religious. At the same time, politics has a constitutive, nonreligious dimension 
insofar as it is not religious in the strictest sense–i.e., suprarational. In the 
suprarational realm, politics has no place. Politics and religion are two sides 
of the same coin–the public sphere. At the center of the public sphere should 
be the person, not the political community, because the person is at the same 
time both a religious and political being–a rational being open to supraration-
ality. Politics and religion are not incompatible, though. What cannot mix are 
some aspects of religion with some aspects of politics, namely suprarationality 
and legal coercion.
The second consideration is that the intrinsic unity of the person (i.e., 
the integration of the person’s individual, social, and transcendent dimen-
sions), based on dignity, cannot be projected onto the community as a whole, 
for dignity is a status of the human person exclusively. When a political com-
munity, using (or abusing) its sovereign power, tries to make its own this in-
trinsic three-dimensionality of the human person, it becomes totalitarian. In 
some ways, the absolute nation-state, based on the idea of sole and exclusive 
sovereignty, is an attempt to substitute dignity for sovereignty as the state’s 
character (appropriating for itself the centrality of the human person). 26 An 
analogous error occurs when a religious community becomes a political com-
munity, without differentiating its religious structure from its political struc-
ture or its religious beliefs from its political action.
The third consideration is that the act of adherence to a faith or creed 
is, by nature, completely free and personal. Faith can be shared within a com-
munity of voluntary membership, as it is in the religious community, but not 
within a community of compulsory membership, as in the so-called complete 
political community. If every person must be a member of at least one political 
26 For more on this argument, see Domingo, R., The New Global Law (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, Cambridge, 2010) pgs. 65-73 and 131-136.
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community to satisfy his or her basic needs and develop his or her personal 
capacities, but a compulsory political community cannot manage transcend-
ence, then the existence of a dualistic structure is a democratic constitutional 
right that guarantees freedom of religion, for the sake of the person’s full de-
velopment.
At the heart of religious freedom is the idea that a purpose of a politi-
cal community is not to make an act of faith based on some religious truth, 
for citizens in this case would not have the required freedom to practice or 
not practice religion. Thus, political and religious communities have different 
purposes, even though both have been established for the sake of the human 
person. Political communities can share religious values, which do not re-
quire acts of faith, but they cannot share concrete religious beliefs as matters 
of law. The communion of faith demands the fullness of freedom, without 
restrictions. This fullness of freedom can only be achieved in a community 
of voluntary membership, not in a community of compulsory membership, 
which would legitimize the existence of the so-called freedom of religion as a 
constitutive element of religious freedom.
The fourth consideration in favor of a dualistic structure is the public 
nature of suprarational law. 27 The suprarational law of historical religions has 
a public nature derived from the communion of faith, insofar as suprarational 
law binds the religious community as a whole, not only each of its members. 
In some religions, such as Judaism and Islam, the public dimension of supra-
rational law is a presupposition of the existence of the very community–there 
is a community because there is suprarational law, not vice versa. Thus, the 
religious community is at the heart of the political community. For the reli-
gious community to avoid taking control of the political community and for 
suprarational law not to be confused with the law of the secular legal system, 
the secular legal system must recognize a religious communitarian structure 
that is ontologically different from the political structure and in which only 
transcendent law operates. 28
From a political point of view, an important consequence of the require-
ment of a dualistic structure is that the legal system of a political community 
27 On the foundation of the idea of transcendent law, see Brague, R., The Law of God. The Phil-
osophical History of an Idea (trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
London, 2008).
28 For further explanation, see Domingo, R., «A New Global Paradigm for Religious Freedom», 
in Journal of Church and State 56 (2014) 427-453.
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does not need for its existence any type of religious legitimation, since a po-
litical community is not an extension of the religious community, but a com-
pletely autonomous community. Another important consequence is that the 
democratization of religious communities cannot be a demand of the political 
agenda of democratic governments. The political community cannot impose 
its constitutional model on the religious community because the two are on-
tologically different. Each community has its own rules, its own institutions, 
and its own proper scope, regardless of which community was born first. Both 
community structures need each other, however, for the good of humanity.
Constitutional dualism warns against the existence of total communi-
ty structures. In general, total community structures are those that do not 
make any substantive distinctions between transcendent law and positive law, 
or those that deny, at least implicitly, transcendent law. Theocracies, including 
constitutional theocracies, are likely to create total community structures, but 
are strong secular liberal political communities when they do not recognize 
the social dimension of religion. Religious and political communities become 
total communities by mutual absorption or mutual exclusion. A religious com-
munity becomes total when, based on the principle of self-determination, it 
also becomes an independent, or at least autonomous, political community 
and objects to the creation of a new dualistic structure that differentiates be-
tween the religious community and the new political community. A religious 
community also becomes total when it tries to impose its religious rules on 
areas that are outside its sphere of business or uses coercive political power 
to impose its criteria on religious issues. A political community, on the other 
hand, becomes total when it tries to control religious communities or fully 
exclude them from the public sphere. History, life’s teacher, offers us many 
examples of total communities in both senses.
The first claim of constitutional dualism is that both communitarian 
structures, the political and the religious, should recognize each other since 
they operate in the same territory and a greater or lesser proportion of the po-
litical community is also part of the religious community structure. Without 
at least an explicit act of recognition, there can be no dualistic structure, only 
a monistic one, which is, by definition, totalitarian.
These two communitarian structures should be ontologically autono-
mous, yet politically interdependent, as all members of religious communities 
must be members of a political community, but not vice versa. Additionally, 
religious communities operate inside and across the territories of a political 
community, so the distinction between political communities and religious 
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communities is a matter of the different goals and aims of each community. 
If a political community fails to recognize the value of religion, it will never 
fully recognize a religious community as an intrinsic piece of the dualistic 
structure.
4. the election of the Dualistic moDel 
as a constitutional Decision
The status that the legal system gives religious communities and the 
degree of interdependence of these communitarian structures determine the 
dualistic constitutional model of a political community. Dualistic structures 
can adopt a wide variety of systems according to history, culture, political ex-
perience, and religious diversity. 29 The options can be classified into four ba-
sic categories: (a) unilateral state primacy over religion (e.g., French laïcité); 
(b) state neutrality (e.g., U.S. nonestablishment); (c) mutual cooperation in 
common purposes (e.g., German collaborationism); and (d) state singling out 
and adoption of a religion as the state religion (e.g., England’s church estab-
lishment). There is a fifth category, the integration of the political community 
into the religious community as an extension of it (theocracy), but this model 
is incompatible with the secular legal system. Therefore, I do not address it 
here.
The models can be specified in so many ways that systems belonging 
to the same group can differ quite widely. French laïcité is different from 
Mexican or Turkish laïcité. German collaborationism is different from Span-
ish, Italian, or Brazilian constitutional models. Among established churches, 
England’s constitutional model is different from Greece’s model (where the 
national religion is Greek Orthodoxy), Denmark (with a strong established 
church), or Malta (where the state religion is Catholicism). The model of the 
United States is in some ways unique because of its originality and the singu-
lar judicial interpretation of the First Amendment. 30 All four constitutional 
29 See in this vein Durham, W. C. Jr., «Patterns of Religion State Relations», in witte, J. Jr. and 
green, Ch., Religion and Human Rights. An Introduction (Oxford University Press, New York, 
Oxford, 2012) pgs. 360-378.
30 For an overview of the different models of church-state separation, see, on Western countries, 
whitman, J. Q., «Separating Church and State: The Atlantic Divide», in Historical Reflections 
34.3 (2008) 86-104; and, for theocratic governance, hirschl, R., Constitutional Theocracy (Har-
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frameworks can be in accordance with a constitutional dualism. There are, 
however, some restrictions that more directly affect the extreme models (e.g., 
laïcité, at least in the French sense) 31 and church establishments.
Laïcité is different from neutrality. Neutraity might involve avoiding 
any official expression of religiosity in the public sphere in order to protect 
freedom of religion, freedom from religion, and social pluralism. But laïcité, 
specifically French laïcité, is based on state sovereignty; whereas American 
neutrality, for example, is bilateral, with mutual noninterference between 
religion and politics. Historically, French laïcité was a constitutional po-
litical reaction against the dominance of Catholicism; American neutrality, 
on the contrary, was a political decision about how to manage Christian 
religious diversity. French laïcité is a consequence of strictly applying the 
principle of state sovereignty to religious issues. 32 American neutrality is 
a consequence of strictly applying the principles of justice and equality to 
religious issues. 33
Thus, under French law, strong state interference with religion is com-
patible with the principle of laïcité since there is an absence of formal state rec-
ognition of institutional religious autonomy. Additionally, as Troper pointed 
out, «the power of the state over religion in France is not just a consequence 
of a preexisting doctrine of sovereignty; it is also constitutive of sovereignty, 
in the sense that the doctrine of sovereign State has been conceived from the 
beginning as an instrument of a religious policy.» 34 If the state is sovereign, no 
subject matter can escape its power, not even religion. So if the French state 
abstains from regulating religion, it is because it is deciding not to exercise any 
sovereign power over religion; however, it could do so if it pleased, based on 
its sovereignty. This justifies the state having ownership of religious buildings, 
vard University Press, Cambridge, MA, London, 2010). For a European overview, see Doe, N., 
Law and Religion in Europe. A Comparative Introduction (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New 
York, 2011). For a general view of the US model, see witte, J. Jr. and nichols, J., Religion and 
the American Constitutional Experiment (3rd ed., Westview Press, Philadelphia, 2011). 
31 For a general view of laïcité, see haarscher, G., La Laïcité (5th ed. PUF, Paris, 2011) and the 
bibliography on pgs. 124-126; poulat, E., Notre Laïcité Publique (Berg International, Paris, 
2003); and gunn, T. J., «Religion and Law in France. Secularism, Separation, and State Inter-
vention», in Drake Law Review 57 (2008-2009) 949-984. 
32 In this vein, see troper, M., «Sovereignty and Laïcité», in Cardozo Law Review 30.6 (2009) 
2561-2574.
33 On specific American neutrality, see Koppelman, A., Defending American Religious Neutrality 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London, 2013) esp. pgs. 15-45.
34 troper, M., «Sovereignty and Laïcité», in Cardozo Law Review 30.6 (2009) 2564. 
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and the prohibition of wearing religious signs or subsidizing religious schools. 
Laïcité defends dualism, but submits the religious community to the unique 
sovereignty of the political community. For that reason, a strong, unhealthy 
form of laïcité could violate individuals’ free exercise of religion.
Having a church establishment clause can fit with the principle of dual-
ism, but again only with some restrictions. First, the church and state should 
be perfectly differentiated. An established church cannot and should not be a 
«department of the state.» Church establishment should not imply or impose 
an act of faith onto fellow citizens or use a concrete religious argument in legal 
deliberation. Religious establishment should never support the recognition 
of a religion as a true religion, since a political community is not competent 
in suprarational matters. Religious establishment should imply exclusively an 
official recognition of the social values of a concrete religion, which is precise-
ly what justifies a specific legal position for a concrete religious community 
inside a political community. In my opinion, this is the only way to justify the 
establishment of a religion in a democratic society. In practice, church estab-
lishment often endangers both individual freedom and equality. Even if it is 
merely formal, it promotes a political entanglement with religion, which may 
lead to a lack of impartiality in treating religion as a social phenomenon and 
often in treating individual citizens, especially secular citizens. Experiences of 
this abound.
The other two constitutional models of dualism, state neutrality (e.g., 
U.S. nonestablishment) and collaborationism (e.g., the German model) fit 
completely with the dual system. State neutrality is based on the negative 
principle of abstention as the best way to promote and guarantee the proper 
development of religious phenomena in public life. The model of collab-
orationism is based on the positive principle of cooperation searching for 
collaboration between political and religious communities to achieve com-
mon goals. Both models have advantages and disadvantages. U.S. neutrality 
promotes equal treatment of religion and protects the required autonomy 
of religious communities. But it risks degenerating into a strict separation-
ist model, nearer to laïcité, which defends a secular establishment in which 
individual religious freedom is restricted. The advantages of the model of 
religious collaborationism are its openness to religion and the fact that reli-
gion is regarded as a public good with a clear space in public life. There are, 
however, two disadvantages of the collaborationist model: (a) the model can 
easily fall into an excessive and undesirable entanglement between religion 
and politics, and (b) it can come to involve religious preference, and thus 
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unequal treatment of communities and citizens. The German system of a 
church tax, which covers approximately 80% of the entire church budget, 
is probably a case of excessive entanglement between religious and political 
communities.
The precise scope of the protection of religion depends on the nature and 
framework of the constitutional model. Extensions of protection are justified 
by reasons of equality (which favor treating sufficiently analogous phenomena 
similarly), not by the precise argument that justifies the protection of religion. 
A secular legal system is not equipped to weigh the rational coherence of the-
ological doctrine; that is not its business. However, the secular political com-
munity should favor religion because without religion, there is no secularity, 
just as without sheep there is no shepherd.
I prefer the American model of neutrality; 35 however, the political com-
munity has the exclusive power and right to freely decide the constitutional 
model of its relationship to the religious communitarian structure. This deci-
sion should not be shared by the religious communities because it is a political 
decision in the strictest sense and should be based on cultural, historical, and 
moral grounds. According to their constitutional model, political communi-
ties can allow or ban concrete religious education in public schools, and re-
ligious symbols and ceremonies in public institutions. Political communities 
can be more or less open to the celebration of religious holidays, as well as to 
the intensity of the presence of religious values in the legal system. They can 
defend religious equality or, on the contrary, can even promote the concrete 
values of a specific religion as a state religion. Political communities can con-
sider religion one of their most important sources of values or as mere matters 
of individual and social freedom that require legal protection. All political 
communities, however, should recognize religious communities, even those 
that defend ideas and views against their own legal system, provided that the 
religious communities operate in accordance with the legal system. This vari-
ety of regulation on religious matters, according to the dualistic constitutional 
model adopted by the political community, protects global pluralism and per-
sonal freedom while assuring the minimum of religious freedom demanded 
by human dignity.
35 In the same sense, Koppelman, A., Defending American Religious Neutrality (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA, London 2013) pgs. 1-14.
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5. conclusion
Suprarationality is a sufficient condition for the existence of religion and 
the ultimate justification for its legal protection because suprarationality con-
stitutes a constitutive extrinsic limit of the legal, just as the land is an extrinsic 
limit of the seas. However, the protection of religion cannot be reduced to the 
protection of suprarationality. By analogical extension, it should be applied 
to protect other types of beliefs and even non-religion. To treat believers and 
nonbelievers equally does not require treating religion as non-religion; that 
would be a contradiction in terms. Suprarational acts and arguments should 
be free from legal reasoning. Since suprarational acts demand complete indi-
vidual and collective freedom, a dualistic structure in which they are beyond 
the reach of coercion should be established in all democratic societies in order 
to protect religions and freedom of religion.

